The GNU

There can be no doubt that South Africa has been poorly governed over the last two decades. Even the most optimistic observer, passionate about the country’s government, will not deny the stagnation in economic growth, the poor educational outcomes, the poor quality of public health, rampant corruption, tenderpreneurship and the pandemic crime wave sweeping the country.

In terms of policy outcomes, or results, South Africa has not doing well.

The South African economy, in 2023, in terms of real USD values, produced less value, (Gross Domestic Product) than in 2013. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), a measure of the price of specific goods in different countries and is used to compare the absolute purchasing power of the countries' currencies, the economy has increased by USD226,063 billion dollars, or 32,76% (over a ten year period). 

Over this same period, the real GDP per capita decreased by R250 per annum (that is, the amount, in USD, available for each citizen in the country). This was a reduction of 3,99%.

Government debt, as a percentage of GDP, increased from 44,1% ten years back, to 72% in 2023.

The results achieved through a combination of policy, and the bureaucratic effectiveness with which it is implemented, is a vitally important in determining the success or failure of government. Results are what matter to people.

However, there is more to government than that. What also matter to the population, are the method whereby governments are elected and constituted, including the freedoms allowed to citizens and social actors, and the efficiency with which the collective governing system is operating.

In this regard, South Africa can be described as a Constitutional, democratic state. Essential freedoms, such as civil rights and freedom of expression, are Constitutionally protected, and generally respected by government, but also under increased pressure, as centralised power concentrations, and the use thereof in pursued of what is labelled the developmental transformative state, increasingly clash with the requirements to maintain an open society.

All of these elements operate in a corrupt and highly ineffective system, which is the reason for the poor outcomes of the policy – and governance processes.

The problem is that this democratic state is characterised by bureaucratically inefficient centralisation. In theory at least, the model of centralised, top-down government applied in South Africa, is highly dependant on implementation by a very efficient, professional bureaucracy. Even then, where these conditions exist, such as in the Nordic countries, the ideological paradigms of such as approach have been proven as impractical and unworkable, and has been dropped; in spite of the availability of extremely effective and efficient supporting bureaucracies.

In South Africa, the bureaucracy is inefficient and ineffective, and the impractical policy agenda is further worsened by inaccurate, ideologically-driven assumptions about ideology, race and development.

Since 1994, South African politics, and the exercising of state power, has been dominated by the ANC. In my view, it will take the breaking of this grip to salvage the country’s fate. But when I refer to domination by the ANC, and the breaking of its grip, I meant it in a holistic sense; including its "offspring", such as the EFF, MK Party and others that are even worse. I am actually talking about an ideological replacement.

In the May 2024 general elections, for the first time in thirty years, the African National Congress did not achieved an outright majority of fifty percent plus one of the vote. This enforced an arrangement of power-sharing that will enable the country’s government to pass bills in Parliament, appropriate money and continue the administration of South Africa. The result was the Government of National Unity. However, and this is the important point, I am not so sure that it implied the breaking of the ideological grip of the ANC.

The GNU includes ten political parties, but it is especially the apparent partnership between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance that has had the media, and the emotions, vivid.

The GNU has been enthusiastic embraced by the business community and mainstream media inside South Africa and in most of the Western World.

The question is whether this optimism is based in fact or fiction? In this production, I analyse this question and give my opinion about the GNU, supported by analysis of what I believe to be relevant data.

The ANC and the GNU

I am convinced that what the ANC had in mind, following the results of the 2024 elections, was to establish a mechanism where all parties that wish could participate, but also where the ultimate power will remain in ANC hands.

The ANC never intended their version of the GNU to be a coalition between itself and the DA. The persistence that it was actually a coalition between the two main parties in the agreements from various corners, including mainstream media in South Africa, goes against everything the Party (that is, the ANC) has said and done since the GNU arrangements was announced. There is just nothing, literally nothing, in what representatives of the ANC have said or done, since the inception of the GNU, that support the coalition-theory.

Following the results of the 2024 general elections, the ANC found itself in a conundrum. They had to find a way to govern the country, which required a Parliamentary majority. They had received only 40% of the popular votes. In terms of South Africa’s proportional representation system, this implies that they have received an equal number of seats in the National Assembly.

For them to secure the required fifty percentage plus one of the votes in Parliament, they considered three options. Firstly, the run a minority government, and rely on possible partners voting with them on a case-to-case basis. Secondly, the form a coalition with specific parties that will bring together a voting block exceeding fifty percent in Parliament. Thirdly, they could invite all interested parties to join them in a broad gathering of minds. They chose the latter option.

The DA may regard the GNU as an agreement primarily between itself and the ANC, but the ANC does not. Fikile Mbalula has been persistent and steadfast on this point since the very inception of the GNU. And the ANC is acting accordingly.

There are no signs or evidence that the ANC goes out of its way to consult the DA about important policies issues. They have always said, and stick to it, that the DA can leave the GNU whenever they want to. And they act accordingly. This was evident from the way the Bela Act was handled, the NHI debate and South Africa’s foreign policy.

Ramaphosa consults, yes, but he consults broadly among GNU partners, and only up to a point. There has been no victories for the DA in the NGU, but many for the ANC.

The ANC has treated, and handled, the DA with a type of contemptuous annoyance, ever since its (the GNU’s) inception. This is probably, at least partly, an unconscious way of distancing itself from the perception, eagerly stirred by revolutionary forces to its left, that it is in bed with the traditional enemy; the inheritance of the Apartheid system.

Yes, the financial sector, and then specifically the mainstream corporate sector in South Africa, preferred a coalition between the ANC and DA. And yes, indeed, it has “threatened”, to some extent, a sorts of economic collapse in the country if the ANC should have selected to work with the EFF and MKP. Yes, this reality had an impact on thinking of Ramaphosa and other moderate’s in the ANC’s thinking about constituting a government. The idea of the GNU, and the DA’s participation in it, was, in this regard, a convenient relieve to the more free-market orientated group in the ANC. But the arrangement, from the side of the ANC, was never meant as a coalition between itself and the DA.

Central to my argument is that the ANC does not need the DA. Maybe, to some extent, Ramaphosa “need” the DA, but the ANC, in its entirety, does not. Most of South Africa does not support the DA’s policies, and never will; well, not in the foreseeable future, anyway. Neither do most of the voters support the ideological point of departure of the DA.

The point is this: Ideologically, the ANC, compared to the DA, got the majority behind it. It is wrong to interpret the inclusion of the DA in the GNU as the ANC “shifting right”; in fact, if anything, the GNU has caused it to shift to the Left.

The DA and the GNU

Helen Zille started negotiating with the ANC about a possible coalition, before the elections. John Steenhuizen, Helen Zille and numerous other politicians in the DA, have persistently told voters that they will never work with the ANC; even as late as on the eve of elections. After the elections, the DA, that is always quick to claim the moral high-ground, then turn around and do exactly what you have always said you will never do. I, honestly, have a problem with that. It wasn’t a matter of introspection, but simply political manoeuvring.

Polls were clear. Even the ANC know that they will not achieve a 50% majority. Both the ANC, as well as the DA, have clearly prepared for that scenario prior to the elections, but yet the DA persist with the illusion that they will not work with the ANC; most likely to prevent a 2019-style backlash and exodus to the Freedom Front Plus.

I do understand the theoretical justification for the decision to participate in the GNU, from the side of the DA. The argument is one of “the lesser of two evils to prevent the utter demise of South Africa.”

If you can get a political party with the ability for clean, excellent governance into a coalition arrangement, where it can have real sway, it could theoretically save South Africa. However, the question must be whether that is possible, at any level?

The DA’s claim of governance excellent is limited to examples in the Western Cape. In spite of popular claims to the opposite, there are no substantiated proof that the coalition government led by the DA has made any noticeable positive difference in the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. Johannesburg is collapsing; a process that has simply continued during the period when the DA was the leading party in coalitions governing the city.

The ANC is entirely corrupt. What does it say about the moral compass of the DA if one of their major objectives, as a member of the GNU, has become to protect Ramaphosa against a vote in Parliament to investigate Phala-Phala? The DA traditionally crucified the ANC about a bloated Cabinet. Now, apparently, now that they are part of Cabinet, the size thereof is not an issue.  

However, there is another issue to be mentioned in so far as ethical, good governance is concerned: It seems to me like DA deployees are all too often willing to engage in rather questionable practices where they govern, similar to the ANC.

All of that can be understood, and forgiven, if the DA could secure strategic policy advantages from it in the medium – to long-term. But there’s no evidence that the DA exercises any moderating influence of the ANC’s most destructive policies.

No important Cabinet positions where the fate of the country are determined, was allocated to the DA; except for Education. And in Education, the DA has suffered one of its worse ideological defeats, with the full implementation of the Bela Act. Furthermore, I am not so sure that the DA’s employee in the position of Education Minister wholeheartedly supports her party’s resistance to Bela.

None of the DA’s nominated Ministries have had a meaningful positive impact on development in South Africa. The much published improved efficiencies in Ministries no under control of DA minister will have no meaningful impact of the country’s developmental trajectory.

There are factions in all political parties, including the DA. Each and every time, without a single exception that I am aware of, the first reaction of non-white incumbents in the DA that had a conflict with the party’s leadership, was that the party is racist and anti-transformative. Mmusi Maimane, the former leader of the party, was clear about his strong believes in far-reaching affirmative action, employment equity and black economic empowerment. Lindiwe Mazibuko left because of this reason. Athol Trollip left because Maimane has left. Phumzile Van Damme left the party because of this reason. Randall Williams made this claim. Many, many more examples can be cited.

I believe that this issue refers to the elephant in the room, as far as the DA is concerned.

The DA is a pro-capitalist party. No quarrels.

A prosperous future for South Africa can only be assured when every South African child receives a quality education, and when all adults have sufficient skills for dignified employment. No quarrels.

A believe in the South African people. No quarrels.

Freedom and opportunity. No quarrels.

Fairness (as a general normative principle). No quarrels.

Integral to a fair society are the requirements that opportunity is plentiful and not concentrated in the hands of the few, that everyone has the means to make use of their opportunities, that the strong do not exploit the weak, that we are free from unfair discrimination and that we remove the barriers erected by Apartheid which are still felt today. No quarrels.

South Africa is a richly diverse society. Though our people come from different origins, worship in different ways and have different cultures and customs, we are all unique individuals. Diversity is one of South Africa’s greatest assets. No quarrels.

The government is accountable to the people. A system of social security to protect people from extreme poverty; The delivery of high-quality basic services; Excellent education and healthcare; A functional criminal justice system to keep people safe; A growing economy to enable people to access jobs, and Measures to level the playing field of opportunities, as quickly as possible, for people who today are still at a disadvantage because of the injustices of the past. No quarrels.

The DA will achieve nothing to improve my interests or address my concerns in South Africa. At the top of my mind is affirmative action and race-based redress.

I have never, not even once, heard any senior leader of the GNU objecting to the ANC's stance about transformation as ANC policy.

The GNU with or without the DA; it doesn’t matter. Makes no difference to me or my life. It will not improve anything; only cause a few months of delusional optimism. Then everything will collapse back into well-deserved pessimism and reality.

Does Ramaphosa needs the DA?

Cyril Ramaphosa needs the DA, to some extent, to safe-guard him against the wrath of his enemies, but the ANC, as an organisation, does not.

It wasn’t the ANC that has entered into an agreement with the DA and Freedom Front; it was the Ramaphosa section in the ANC, dragging along the organisation. But the resentment about it in the ANC is enormous, fuelled by the aggressive response from ANC partners against it, including the SACP and Cosatu.

However, Ramaphosa’s role in this matter must be contextualised. He has multiple and powerful enemies inside and outside the ANC; including Jacob Zuma, who apparently hate him with a passion. He simply cannot afford a situation where these antagonists are placed in a position to challenge him; especially because they still have huge support in the ANC.

Ramaphosa is associated with the more moderate side of the ANC. He is openly a huge admirer of Nelson Mandela, and some of the sentiments of the Mandela-era of the country’s history, towards reconciliation and inclusion, may have stuck with him. Speaking about the importance of the private sector during State of National addresses, and also considering his own involvement in business, he is also probably part of the more pro-free market faction in the ANC.

However, Ramaphosa must not be misunderstood. He primarily serves a socialist agenda, and is one-sided in his understanding of racial issues. His speeches have been quite fundamentalist over the years. Ramaphosa’s utterances are often rather vicious in targeting and blaming White South Africans. He tends to oversimplify complex racial issues, like inequality, and simplify it into the narrative of “All Whites Rich:” versus “All Blacks Poor.” He clearly understands racial theory in the context of Critical Race Theory, leaving no room for acknowledging Black-on-White racism.

Ramaphosa does not recognise the existence of White poverty, the racial dimensions of Farm Attacks and the devastating impact of post-1994 redress on the lives and careers of White South Africans; well, not formally, anyway.

This is also not a phenomenon coinciding with the resistance to the GNU in the ANC’s tripartite alliance partners; it has been a trend throughout his re-emergence on the political scene when he was appointed Deputy President by Zuma.

Does Ramaphosa need the DA in the GNU? Ideologically no. He understands the potential destructive implications of financial markets, should the DA be replaced by the MKP and EFF, but will not will not go out on a limb for the DA to retain the partnership because of it. He does, however, need the DA to protect him, in Parliament, against the vicious anger of his enemies. That, ironically, is perhaps the single most important consideration that will convince Ramaphosa to fight for retaining the current GNU arrangement.

The ANC is a destructive force

To make my next point, it will be important to analyse the assumption that the ANC will govern South Africa in the foreseeable future, because it will only be the governing party that will have the power to be destructive, or, alternatively, build the country.

The ANC got over twelve and a half million votes in the 2024 elections; considering both national, - as well as regional ballots. The DA got just below seven million. However, the MK received four and a half million votes, and the EFF just over three million. The only party that will practically support the DA’s agenda, is the Freedom Front Plus. This party received four-hundred and fifty thousand votes.

These votes translate into 40,8% for the ANC, 21,8% for the DA, 14,58% for the MK, 9,52% for the EFF and 1,36% for the Freedom Front Plus. Together, the DA and the Freedom Front Plus received just over 23% of the votes.

The reality is that a DA driven political and ideological agenda simply does not have the numbers behind them to prevent a so-called doomsday scenario. Perhaps, for the interim, it may postpone the inevitable, but it will not prevent it.

Leftist political groupings in South Africa represented almost 75% of the electorate, and the more moderate alternative only approximately 25%. Ironically, the parties in the GNU represents 73% of the electorate, and parties outside it only 27%.

Let’s for the sake of argument, and specifically for the purposes of this video clip, assume that the “Left” of politics, in South Africa, is represented by parties supporting radical racial redress, aggressive land reform, including expropriation without compensation, an social support network funded by the state and a socialist economic dispensation. The “Right” will be defined in terms of protection of private ownership, holistic development policies for greater equality, as oppose to radical racial redress, emphasis on classical liberal civil rights and support to social vulnerable groups towards self-sustainability, rather than direct intervention.

In terms of trends, there is nothing in the South African election history that indicate a swing towards moderate policies. If election outcomes are analysed, the trend is towards leftist policies; both in terms of new political parties, entering the frame since 1994, and then specifically the EFF and MK, as well as in terms of ideological orientations inside existing political formations. In this regard, I specifically refer to the clear signs that the pendulum in the ANC have, and are, shifting to the left.

In my analysis, I have categorised the ideological orientation of the ANC over the elections periods 1995-2014 as centre left. It is my opinion that the ANC has always been what it is today, which is basically a leftist political formation driven by socialist and race-based policies. But, in 1994, the party was confronted by a mixture of global conditions and moderate leaders.

There was the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the demise of the Soviet Union. With it, communism, as an ideology, was under enormous pressure. With it, there was a feeling, a political tolerance, in South Africa, resulting from Nelson Mandela’s active efforts to achieve reconciliation in the country. Add to that the dominance of the Thabo Mbeki – Trevor Manual combination, which dominated the ANC decision-making for more than a decade. Mbeki was Western educated and ideologically flexible enough to read and interpret the signs of his time, and adapt policy accordingly. In practice, its policy agenda was leftist central in nature, rather than reflective of its real extreme ideological foundations.

However, since 2008, there has been a radicalization in the ANC; initially gradually, but since 2016, rapidly. Partly it has been because of Zuma’s corruption, and his aggressive response to civil society’s resistance to it, but partly it was also because the global dynamics have changed. Capitalism was under pressure after the 2008 economic crisis, and socialist policies gained renewed acceptance, and popularity. China's rise, and its very ability to challenge the dominance of the United State's, as well as Russia's increased aggression towards the West woke the dormant resentment about the policy movement to the right in the ANC. This emboldened ideological theorists in the party to pursue its National Democratic Revolution agenda with increased vigour.

Furthermore, breakaways to the left of the party caused considerable anxiety about losing the war for the hearts and minds of the section of the population that represents the majority; which, in turn, could result in the loss of political power, and, with it, ill-gained, but more than considerable economic advantages.

I’m aware of the research by the Social Research Foundation that eighty two point six percent of South Africans want government to do appointments on merit. I also know that three of South Africa’s four largest political parties, collectively representing almost sixty-five percent of all voters, will never agree to this. There is no doubt in my mind that most South African voters do want the kind of redress promised by the ANC and parties to the Left. The political path of South Africa is to the Left, not to the Right.

It is often said that one of the reasons for the ANC's loss of popular support prior to the 2024 elections, was the opposition in the Black middle class to plans of government to scrap private medical aid. That may be, but where did that lost supporters go? Not to the DA; it predominantly went to parties that also support the principles of radical redress.

The Black youth are not as emotionally attached to the freedom struggle, and its legacies, as their parents and grant-parents. But, ironically, especially among them, there is a committed believe that the problem is the lack of transformation and socialism, and not the policies of transformation and socialism, in itself. The blame for the country’s misery is put on the lack of transformation, and not on transformation itself.

The shift towards the left has convinced me to re-classify the ANC’s ideological and policy position as Fundamentalist Left.

There is just no way that policies such as extremely aggressive affirmative action, Black Economic Empowerment that has entered the terrain of the absurd, land redistribution without compensation, the stripping of the independent decision-making rights of civil society (such as school governing bodies) and a leftist, destructive health policy, such as the NHI, can be regarded as “centre”; it is fundamentalist.

The ANC pursues a destructive and discriminatory policy agenda, which will eventually destroy the country.

The ANC’s policy framework is anything but growth – or development friendly. The ANC is all about the National Democratic Revolution; a vaguely defined concept that essentially implies race-based socialism with strict central control over all and everything, with the exception of the private sector dimensions required to keep the cadre loyal and devoted to the cause.

But it is also necessary to understand the strange application of National Democratic Socialism in the ANC in its proper context. Socialism is popular policy, for both historic, - as well as populist reasons. However, this policy must not tremble on the need for tenderpreneurs and loyal cadres to feet at the through.

Consider recent ANC led policies: Increased BBBEE, more aggressive employment equity legislation, the NHI, the Bela Act and various proposals that have, for now, been shelved because of fierce public resistance.

It must also be kept in mind that the ANC cling for life-and-death to outdated ideological theories, dating back to the 1960 and seventies. For today's realities, its implementation will be disastrous for the country.

The ANC is also, in its very nature, anti-Western in orientation. The increasingly aggressive expression of this sentiment holds extreme risks for the South African economy and geo-political positioning.

The ANC is not the “good-guys” suddenly presented by the DA and Freedom Front. The ANC of the pre-2024 election years is still exactly the same ANC, except that it has turned substantially to the left and more race-orientated than ever before. There is nothing in recent trends that show that either the country, or the ANC, has moved to more moderate policies or ideological orientations; just the opposite.

There is no wide-spread support for the GNU, and then specifically the cooperation with the DA and Freedom Front Plus, in the ANC. There never was.

There is no wide-spread support for the GNU, and then specifically the cooperation with the DA and Freedom Front Plus, in the ANC. There never was.

The issue is not the DA or the Freedom Front Plus per se; it is the perceptions of what they are. The DA is perceived as the former National Party in disguise. It is closely associated with a White identity, apartheid and racism. It doesn’t matter how many Black supporters and public representatives the DA has; it is the perception that matters.

All these perceptual factors are emphasised and duplicated in the case of the Freedom Front Plus.

The issue is not the DA or the Freedom Front Plus per se; it is the perceptions of what they are. The DA is perceived as the former National Party in disguise. It is closely associated with a White identity, apartheid and racism. It doesn’t matter how many Black supporters and public representatives the DA has; it is the perception that matters.

All these perceptual factors are emphasised and duplicated in the case of the Freedom Front Plus.

There is no doubt that the anti-DA sentiments in the ANC are dominant. Not a single person in the ANC top structures with a realistic chance of competing for the ANC leadership in 2027 are in favour of the DA – and Freedom Front inclusion in the GNU. It is simply a matter of time before this coalition will collapse.

The DA’s proposed solutions are artificial, at best. The ANC will never accept the version of capitalism required to growth the country’s economy, and neither the elimination of current targets-driven manifestations of transformation. Without that, the DA’s plans are, at best, theoretical discussions.

The ANC will never accept it, because they don’t need to; because it will be to their detriment.

Most of the ANC regards the DA as an enemy in their midst. For me the first signs that the DA will achieve nothing, was when Lesufi left the party out of the coalition arrangements in Gauteng, clearly in spite of the ANC’s national leaderships’ wishes. The important thing, for me, was the fact that it proven my suspicions that there was enough counter-forces in the ANC to allow the fundamentalists, such as Lesufi, to get away with it.

The DA’s proposed solutions are artificial, at best. The ANC will never accept the version of capitalism required to growth the country’s economy, and neither the elimination of current targets-driven manifestations of transformation. Without that, the DA’s plans are, at best, theoretical discussions.

The ANC will never accept it, because they don’t need to; because it will be to their detriment.

Most of the ANC regards the DA as an enemy in their midst. For me the first signs that the DA will achieve nothing, was when Lesufi left the party out of the coalition arrangements in Gauteng, clearly in spite of the ANC’s national leaderships’ wishes. The important thing, for me, was the fact that it proven my suspicions that there was enough counter-forces in the ANC to allow the fundamentalists, such as Lesufi, to get away with it.

To be clear. My opinion is that the ANC will govern South Africa into the foreseeable future; not necessarily as the unit we see today, but as an Ideological Idea. It is highly likely, if not sure, for all practical purposes, that the splinter groups of the EFF and MK will, at some point, play a key role in this Alliance. This is the dominant Ideology in the country, and, in terms of populist support, it is not under threat.

Within this context, and from this perspective, I assume that the ANC will govern, which then bring into play their destructive policies.

Let me just, in conclusion of this section, consider the ANC’s choices in respect of a governing partner.

The ANC has forty percent of the voting power in Parliament. In most policy issues, the party can simply partner with the EFF and MK parties. This is exactly what happened with the BELA and NHI Acts.

Even if The EFF and MK do not actively support the ANC, but just withhold their votes, in much issues the DA will vote against ANC policy proposals, because of the ideological divide, and the ANC will still get their wish. Here’s the issue: The GNU is a theoretical voting bloc in Parliament only. It was used to elect ANC bigwigs to powerful positions.

The ANC is not dependent on the DA to stay in, and exercise state power. In fact, the collaboration is directly counter to the ideological divides in the country.

I hear the argument about protection of the Constitution. But, fact of the matter is that the DA and Freedom Front Plus, as well as other parties believing in Constitutionalism, in such instances, vote with the DA and like-minded parties to protect the Constitution. No formal partnership-agreement is needed for that.

The following information have been quoted from a document published by (DeLoitte), titled South Africa Economic Outlook, November 2024.

(https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/emea/africa-economic-outlook.html

Investor sentiment and domestic confidence have improved post elections, but structural reforms and growing fixed investments are imperative for South Africa’s long-term prosperity and growth. The author has been Hannah Marais

Hannah Marais is a senior associate director in Financial Advisory, where she leads the South Africa Economic Advisory practice. She is also Deloitte’s chief economist for Southern Africa. Until the end of 2023, Marais led the firm’s Insights portfolio, producing research-based thought leadership across Africa. She has also previously led Knowledge Management for Deloitte Africa. Over the last 18 years, Marais has worked with corporate and government leaders, providing market assessments, market-entry and -expansion strategies, policy analyses and strategic advice, trade and investment analyses, socioeconomic impact analyses, as well as macroeconomic outlooks, and reviews.

Is the GNU good news for the economy? 

I don’t think the main issue in South Africa’s lack of economic growth is about commitment and stability. I think the main issues are the exclusion of many South Africans, with their skills and creativity, from the economy based on their race; it is socialist economic policies, and it is an inflexible labour market that makes it extremely high risk to invest in the country’s economy.

This is the thing with South African policy-makers and influencers; they argue and talk all around the point; all around all those “untouchables”; while the “untouchables” are really the major issues that cause the country to collapse more-and-more. It’s like “if we don’t mention it”, it’s not there, it’s not a reality, and it can therefore not be a cause of the bad things that’s happening.

In some instances, I am sure that the purist in Leftist formations sincerely believe that the so-called transformation policies in the economy are not contributing towards economic stagnation; and, in other instances, they know, but they don't care - the Ideology is superseding the reality.

Much is made of the positive spin-offs of the GNU on the economic front. The following information have been quoted from a document published by Deloitte, titled South Africa Economic Outlook, November 2024.

Between the end of February and the end of September 2024, the country’s sovereign risk premium improved from 327 to 240 basis points.

South Africa’s 10-year bond yield dropped to below 10%—its lowest in almost three years.

The rand appreciated to its strongest level against the US dollar in almost two years in September 2024.

By the end of October 2024, South Africans celebrated more than 200 successive days (over two quarters) of no loadshedding, following years of intermittent power outages, and many other structural constraints in sectors such as transport and logistics, which had crippled the economy and limited its potential. 

The Absa purchasing manager’s index increased into expansionary territory at 53.3% in September and stayed positive in October (52.6%), while the Rand Merchant Bank/Bureau for Economic Research business confidence index reached its best reading (38 index points) in almost two years in the third quarter of 2024.

Year on year, the first six months of the year saw the economy expand by 0.5%.

Consumer price index inflation already dropped to 5.2% year on year in April 2024, down from 5.6% in February 2024. By August it dropped lower to 4.4%, which is just below the midpoint of the 3% to 6% inflation target band set by the South African Reserve Bank. A further slowing down of inflation to 3.8%, in September, and 2.8% in October—the lowest value recorded since June 2020—was largely due to the strength of the rand, falling fuel prices, and slowing food price inflation.

I have just taken some of the points from the report, for illustration purposes. The viewer can read the entire report on the website of Deloitte South Africa.

I am of the opinion that the seemingly positive trends in the South African economy has to do with positive sentiment, following the eagerness in the business sector and among investors about the collaboration between the ANC and the DA. However, in reality, nothing meaningful has changed, and very little actual positive outcomes can be expected.

The ANC has not changed its economy policy; and, remember, the party is in control of all Ministries governing public economic policy (except for Small Business Development, which does not actually regulates economic policy, but must try to create new businesses, in spite of economic policy).

Actual economic growth has been disappointing.

Much of the initial optimism, and positive sentiment, resulting from the GNU, is fast evaporating.

The Ideology, the philosophy, of the state must provide; the state must enrich previous disadvantage business people, is closer entrenched in the minds of the government classes in South Africa than even before; in spite of the fact that it has been disastrous over the last 30 years, and in spite of the fact that the justification for it is based on outdated arguments, the relevance of which has long lapsed. For instance, the argument that White business has been successful because they were propelled by the state, has lost its relevance the moment that hundreds of schemes were introduced in the country, over the last 30 years, to support Black business, to the exclusion of White businesses. The problem is that so much of this money has gone into tenderpreneurs, into a few extremely rich individuals closely connected with the governing elite, and into unbelievably bloated pricing schemes, that there is very little left to make small business work in the country.

The point is this: The ANC’s economic policy direction is based on false, Ideologically-driven assumptions, and often on pure racist preference and patterns of inclusion and exclusion. There is not only a conceptual problem with this situation, but fact of the matter is that these policies have failed over the last thirty years to add positive value to the economy. Yet the governing party (that is, the GNU) has double down on it.

A second point to be made is that neither the DA, or the Freedom Front Plus, and not any other of the more moderate parties included in the GNU will be able to change this situation, to stop preferential economic allocation and redistribution, or an extremely inflexible labour dispensation.

Conclusions

I do not support the GNU. I have never supported it.

It is futile for South Africans to cling to the Government of National Unity, with the hope that it will be the saving of the country. It will definitely not be.

I have four arguments to substantiate my resistance to the GNU.

Firstly, the ANC is ideologically much more inclined towards the radical left than the capitalist right. It is personal, - rather than ideological motivators that has drifted it towards the DA, rather than the MK and EFF. In the country, holistically speaking, the ideological orientation, as well as current election trends, towards the Left are much stronger than towards the Right. More than that, he struggle inside the ANC has actually already been won by forces resistant to the GNU.

Secondly, the DA needs the ANC much more than the ANC the DA. The DA has joined the GNU under the mistaken believe that they are special, that the ANC desperately needs them, and that they will actually have a more-or-less equal say in government affairs.

This was never the ANC’s intention. The ANC wanted to establish a “Consensus of Parties” after they did not achieved an absolute majority in the May 2024 elections, but (and this point is vital) with themselves keeping control and continuing not only their policy framework, but also their patronage networks.

Thirdly, the ANC has not all of a sudden became the squeaky cleanness and efficiency of governance excellence. It was as if the DA, Freedom Front Plus, and perhaps other parties as well, went to bed on the twenty-eight of May with a dirty, despicable ANC in mind, only to woke up on the morning of the twenty-ninth with a squeaky clean ANC, worthy of protecting at all cost. The ANC is internally corrupt to the core, and religiously follows a path towards the so-called National Democratic Revolution that is destroying the country.

Fourthly, the forces to the Left of the ANC matters, and they matters a lot, in terms of the GNU. Both the MK, as well as the EFF have originated from the ANC. They understand the ANC, and the way in which the party is thinking. They are nothing else but more radical extensions of the ANC. They influence the policy direction of the country, not only in terms of setting the tone of the national political debate, but also in terms of the influence they have on influencers inside the ANC.

There is a perception that the financial markets will severely punish the country if the DA is not included in government. To some extent this may be true. However, the question is: How sustainable is this as a motivator to keep the party in the GNU, considering the enormous resistance the ANC is getting from the Left?

I don’t think it has that much convincing influence. The ANC is inherently and ideologically hostile to capitalist financial markets. The party is equally hostile and aggressive towards Western countries, which are the primary ones demanding the inclusion of the DA in the GNU.

The question must also be asked: How much real, tangible value has the GNU actually contribute to the economic welfare of the country, to date? There seems to be positive indicators, but economic growth remains very weak. It really doesn’t seems that the DA or Freedom Front Plus have any moderating impact on policies of the ANC; and neither have any of these parties contributing meaningfully to development in the country.

Finally, and this is an important point: I, personally, will not any longer support any governing arrangement that deliberately excludes and marginalise me or my interests. There is no indication that the GNU will stop such policies; in fact, it seems likely that it will double down on it. Yet, I would have been willing to put up with it, if the positive spin-offs thereof would have developed the country, and its economy, to such an extent, that I, in spite of the discrimination, would have felt the benefits in a tangible manner. It will not happen.

And that, then, is my opinion on the GNU.

Image source: SA Good News